

Chief, Foreign Division M

2 June 1950

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Operational

KIBITZ Progress Report

1. The overall pattern of the KIBITZ program remains much the same, with the effort in two general directions; the one a concentration on the deep stay behinds, while the other effort is toward recruiting Phase A men among already trained radio operators (among former German Army commo men and present day amateur radio operators) whose known communications experience condemns them to the ranks of Phase A expendables who will be committed to transmissions work immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities. Noteworthy of the deep stay behind elements is KIBITZ 6 who finished his university exams late in February and has since completed the period from 3 March to 19 April at MISSOURI before returning to the university where he is working as laboratory assistant while preparing for his doctor's degree. And, as soon as MISSOURI space is available, we will have KIBITZ 7 start his training which, as outlined in MGKA-14824, will be on a space available basis, he continuing his doctorate studies in between MISSOURI training periods.

2. This arrangement with 7 is most convenient as, for example, we are presently concerned with the problem of timing 9a's training to coincide with a temporary lay-off from the factory where he works. KIBITZ 9a, a former German Army commo man (therefore of our Phase A group) whom we are particularly anxious to nail down with the training program, will need but seven to ten days to bring him up to primary commo agent proficiency.

3. So, while we are presently able to keep MISSOURI scheduled for the next couple of months with opportune vacationings and temporarily unemployed recruits, we have as yet to solve the problem of training the fully employed recruits who just can't up and leave their jobs for six week sessions at MISSOURI. And even the seven to ten days necessary for the Phase A men is sometimes difficult to arrange. We are hopefully looking to the projected MISSOURI mobile unit to help toward solving this problem. However, even when the mobile unit is available, we'll be hard pressed to cram what is normally a six weeks training course into a part time program for the long range stay behinds, of whom we have seven who could start immediately.

4. So while we are ahead on the long range program, we are giving, meantime, concentration toward recruiting for Phase A, men already experienced in

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basic communications and who, according to our experience with KIBITZ 10, can be pushed through the primary commo agent training in a matter of a few days. Such training requirements are more compatible to a part time training program and will more readily provide us with zone coverage of radio operators during the interim of training the long range stay behinds. However, though this phase of the program may speed up the training program, recruiting still requires the full treatment. As partial solution, we have feelers out for a few German Army signal corps staff officers who in turn could use their prestige and ability to hatch out a few recruits on their own under a tight "Germans for Germany" cover.

5. Naturally there are security limits to the exploitation of any one area of commo agents. So, as another source of Phase A operators, we are working over the German radio hams of whom there are well over 1,000 in the western zones of Germany, with the American Zone enjoying its proportionate share. Again the bogey of establishing overt contact with a group of people presented a problem which we had hoped to solve by training [] and putting him on the air for controlled innocent chit-chat to be followed up with friendly personal contacts, the more promising of which to be introduced to [] for development. However, since [] came under the ban of all organizational personnel engaging in ham activities, we have resorted to a city by city survey of radio hams to ascertain which of them are so situated or employed as to permit overt contact. Obviously this puts us under a severe handicap and cuts down the percentage of returns versus effort. For example, screening the greater Stuttgart area of 52 known hams produced only two promises of entre; one, a 55-year old cafe operator and the other a radio repair man. The latter, opened by taking a couple of our G.I. radios to be repaired, is now responding well to [] (who replaced []) and they are quite buddy-buddy already. The old man of the cafe might be the real find inasmuch as we always wanted a few elderly, more stayable operators but had to discount them due to their inadaptability to code training. Now we have an old ham waiting to be plucked. However, things are still at the coffee drinking stage while casing for a manner in which to convert the man. On the other hand, our first surveys of Mannheim-Heidelberg with 17 listed hams revealed not one overt entre. And Frankfurt, with 39 hams, was no better. So for the time being they still remain a list of just so many names and addresses and we can only hope that by staying with it we will find a break in some way or other.

6. In the meantime we are going on to the Ulm-Augsburg area, to be followed by Munich, Nürnberg, Bayreuth, Würzburg, and Kassel. This will complete the initial surveys after which we will dig deeper until we have trained transmitters lined up in every capital city area. Karlsruhe is for the moment excepted from this program inasmuch as it is too close to home for any of our personnel to work it. As we view it at this writing, Karlsruhe will have to be developed through a cut-out at a later date.

7. Other features under development are surveys for drop zones. In this regard, we have presumed specifications of an isolated area large enough to

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allow for a drop at, say 600 feet, well beyond the view of observers, and within this area, a completely controlled zone where maximum security precautions can be provided for material or personnel drops. One such area is being developed in Bavaria on the KIBITZ 12 property, another in the Kassel area by 11 and 11a. The third, in the hills of Ober Franken (vicinity Bayreuth), was well on its way but suffered a reverse in April when the man who owned the hunting preserve was found dead in the woods. His brother, who owns the land of the drop zone is in our opinion too unsophisticated for a major role without the guidance of the deceased brother. However, we will re-evaluate the situation in our next visit.

8. Also in the developmental stage is, using Civil War terminology, an underground railroad. As we feel our way along in this project, we often must live with and assume the character of the men in the activity for which we are recruiting. And, in these characterizations we have been considering the need for safe houses under the conditions of VULTURE activities. Under stringently policed occupation, our concept of a safe house must be altered to the situation, and certainly private homes or, most likely, small private apartments could not harbor fugitives or nocturnal transients. Instead, we must look to commercial accommodations where such traffic would attract less attention. In this respect, we have been reviewing every inn keeper in our travels around German in the light of a prospective patron. Inasmuch as this is in slight deviation from our brief, we have not pressed the project beyond these exploratory preliminaries. Nor, should this phase of the program meet with Washington approval, do we have enough experience on which to promise a plan of action. However, for discussion purposes, we would like to express the thought that the recruitment should be confined to assessments of the inn keepers and that those qualified be developed on a personal friendship basis to the degree that any one could go to them on a "Joe sent me" type of reference and be assured of care and cover. However, for the long pull of a PASTIME program through successive degenerations of American-German relations, we are inclined toward looking for some German businessmen who, in the course of travel through their trade territory, could build up a series of safe house nets.

9. Lastly, though there are as many reasons for omission as for inclusion, we are constantly faced with the inevitability of including women in the VULTURE program. We Americans are reputed for our neglect in exploiting this potential and essentially, we might continue to do so. However, the VULTURE personnel are of different orientation. As each unit is founded and call is made upon it to supply someone for commo training, the answer comes without variation. And, the logic of it cannot be denied. In the first place, women have always been considered more adaptable to such employment. Secondly, women in present day Germany are more likely to have time to devote to training, and thirdly, women can be considered to have a greater degree of stayability when VULTURE would be activated. We must agree on all three points, but have yet to see solution to the problem of training. The MISSOURI facilities seen to date are not amenable to a co-educational program.

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10. In summary, the following is a review of the net given in chronological order:

KIBITZ 1. A long range stay behind probably not adapted to commo training. Now on stand by basis for future use as informer type agent in a Munich unit.

KIBITZ 2. We are very anxious to get this man trained for commo, but his personal business requires his full attendance. In the meantime he retains his key position in the 2, 4, 5 Unit. He has nominated other prospects but we feel it necessary to restrain his group to present size which makes a complete unit.

KIBITZ 3. Also requires full training, and we foresee him as never more than a commo man in the hands of a strong agent. However his full employment doesn't allow for 6 weeks schedule at MISSOURI. Hope to solve this one by getting him acquainted with a Stuttgart ham who can train him in the fundamentals under a "personal interest" cover.

KIBITZ 4. While showing aptitude for training in initial testing, the problem of getting him trained in spite of full time employment suggests him for the "strong-man" slot in the 2, 4, 5 unit. He, an old war-time mountain trooper, will make them a good Indian.

KIBITZ 5. Already has commo experience and needs only a quickie course at MISSOURI to bring him up to standard. Was for a short while on sick leave from employment in one of the sub-post commissaries due to allergy incurred handling certain bulk food items. However, MISSOURI was not available in this instance, so next best adaptation was to get him transferred to Communications Intelligence Service where he is working as technician and gaining valuable experience.

KIBITZ 6. See paragraph 1. He has recently been furnished indigenous receiving equipment and also a tape self-instructograph to keep up his proficiency. He is operationally divorced from the 2, 4, 5 unit and will organize his own team.

KIBITZ 7. See paragraph # 2.

KIBITZ 8. A little weak in his assignment to build up his unit. He is afraid to expose himself to his prospects. However, we expect that his pro-western anti-Communist ideology will pay off in the end.

KIBITZ 9. Did well enough in developing his unit with recruiting 9a as a start and needs now only one more minor personality to complete minimum for an operating unit. Is now waiting to see how we treat 9a.

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KIBITZ 9a. A former German Army commo man who needs only a week to ten days to get him to our standards. This should not prove too difficult as soon as MISSOURI moves to his native Bavaria.

KIBITZ 10. Completed basic commo training in January and is scouting for recruits to build up his unit. Two candidates so far, one MGKA-15297 and the other MGKA-18708, the last name listed, the latter of whom, a police teletype operator, offer attractive possibilities.

KIBITZ 11. Has probably the best grasp of his problems. Caution has prevented him from recruiting among strangers for a communications man. But his 11a looks like the best yet as far as supporting personnel to date. Between the two of them we have what looks like our strongest team and will be well worth the gift of a commo man from our developing reserves of those commo men lacking leadership to develop their own team.

KIBITZ 11a. (MGKA-15296) His experience in the SS combating the partisans in German-occupied Russia and his later fugitive existence while wanted by the Allies give this man a realistic perspective of the hunter and the hunted. We will expect much from him.

KIBITZ 12. Being developed by [] on a sound basis for providing cover to other VULTURE actives. The present status includes a completed survey of his farm land and hunting preserve with overlays of the area. Next projected are aerial photographs of likely drop zones and preparations of caches. Only hindering factor is his son's unresolved Russian POW status.

[] Hub of the 8, 9, 11 net but with no link to 9a and 11a. He is ambitious and able to recruit more people but is being held back so long as the program is shaping up well enough without further effort and security risk on his part. It is now more important that he take time to build up his own business into a stable concern. He is also of great value in advising us in our problems encountered in approaching the German mentality.

11. The KIBITZ project has been receiving approximately 70 percent of our operational effort, divided between the 15 above mentioned personalities and the development of contacts to be recruited. The cost of this project, for the preceding five-month period, 21 December 1949 through 15 May 1950, was DM 1,781.28.

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